This dispute happens as international trade has become the stage of a violent confrontation between the US and China: a “trade war” which is paralyzing the WTO, particularly as this multilateral institution is attempting to reform itself.

We interviewed Ms Aileen Kwa, a researcher, trade negotiations expert and advocate, heading the Trade for Development Program at the South Center* to learn more about the complexities of the crisis.

What reform is the US putting on the table?

There are four main reforms that were requested by the US and the developed countries. The first reform is relating to the WTO’s rule of consensus regarding decision making. According to this rule, no negotiation can take place unless there is a consensus on its negotiation agenda between all the members a process they want to reform.
The second element of the reform states that several developing countries should not avail trade flexibilities (S&D treatment).
A third element they have been insisting on is what they call transparency and notification measures: the necessity that members make all notifications formally. The proposal indicates that members who default on notifications should be punished.
And the last is about bringing new issues to the discussion, e-commerce for example.

And how did developing countries respond to these suggestions?

Regarding transparency and notification, developing countries were clear that they do not agree on additional notifications. It is impossible for developing countries to abide by the notifications’ requirements. Responding formally to everything, attending meetings and engaging with officials in the capitals of our countries is a resource-intensive process, whereas many of us, including Tunisia’s delegation, are under-represented. Tunisia has only one delegate, trying to cover all the WTO committees and negotiations. It’s an impossible situation.

With regards to other reform suggestions, developing countries had their position on how the reform of the WTO should be; they presented a proposal of which Tunisia was co-sponsor.

The aim of this proposal was to say that the idea of a WTO reform is not a new question. The developing countries had been asking for it since the first round of negotiations called “the Uruguay round” (1986-1994). Therefore, there was already a set of reforms, and a suggested reform agenda from the perspective of developing countries, that was not taken into consideration and which aims at addressing many of the imbalances coming out of the Uruguay round.

The proposal stresses that there are a lot of WTO principles that developing countries want to preserve including consensus decision making. It also reminds us of the issues that developing countries want to discuss such as S&D treatment, aspects of agriculture’s development, implementation issues, and balancing some of the imbalances from the GATT agreement.

But how did all this “battle of reforms” start?

After the Buenos Aires Ministerial Conference in 2017, some developed countries (the EU, Japan, and the US) got frustrated at the fact that developing countries, especially India, South Africa and the Africa Group were not in favour of launching negotiation in some new trade area that they suggested, especially e-commerce. In their opinion, developing countries used the consensus decision-making of the WTO to stop the negotiations on new areas within the WTO.

As a result, during the Ministerial Conference they set up, what is called a plurilateral initiative in the areas of e-commerce, investment facilitation among others. During those meeting, members of developing, developed and least developed countries of the WTO who have accepted to negotiate these topics, will gather and discuss ways forward.

They also started to meet in trilateral form – US, EU and Japan- at the Ministerial level in order to discuss these same issues as well as a reform of the WTO. A big part of the reform they agree on is how to bypass the consensus format of decision making in the WTO in order to continue these plurilateral discussions and negotiate issues of their interest without going through the consensus process. They would later bring the outcome to the multilateral format.

Developing countries view this as a problem, because it would be contrary to the rules of the WTO and will not accept the outcome. It was however not possible to stop these meetings. The breaking point has not come yet: the situation will most likely get more complicated when they finish their negotiation and decide to bring it to the multilateral level.

What did developing countries think of the USA July memorandum on the elimination of what they called “Unfair trade benefits”?

The memorandum was very threatening, yet funny. The US submitted the proposal to reform access of developing countries to the trade flexibilities under the Special & Differential treatment twice this year, in January and in May.

Developing countries refused the US proposal and they made it clear why they think the proposal is unfair and why they still deserve S&D treatment.

But despite their opposition, the USA submitted this same proposal again in July, and of course, did not get support for it. A few days after this, the memorandum was released.

The Special and Differential (S&D) Treatment

These are special rights and flexibilities granted to developing countries under the WTO due to their development status. These flexibilities offer the privilege of maintaining some tariffs to protect the local economy or enjoy longer transition periods to implement WTO rules. These provisions allow more policy space for developing countries to strengthen their economic fabric.

For instance, developing countries were given until January 2000 to adjust their legislations and implement the TRIPs provision. Least Developed Countries were given more time, until 2006 to adapt their legal frameworks and enforce protection of Intellectual property rights.

Why do Developing countries refuse this reform?

The US proposal argued that the poverty rates dropped in Developing countries, and that shall make them equal to developed countries in applying the WTO trade measures. That means they will no longer enjoy flexible implementation calendars, neither should their exported products benefit from preferential treatments, among other flexibilities.

This argument may be true if we use the $2 poverty threshold used by the World Bank. However, if we use $5 or $7 per day as the poverty threshold -which is a more accurate measure according to experts-, the number of poor people increases tremendously, and we can see that people in poverty are still overwhelmingly concentrated in developing countries, including in the most efficient/blooming economies like China. This is why Developing countries find the US proposal unfair and are opposed to it.

Do you think this reform can get through despite developing countries opposition?

It is quite hard to answer. I think the US was very ambitious with its reform. As a powerful country, the US can ask for a lot of things, exert political pressure and get away with almost everything. But how much can they continue pressuring a group of developing countries? I very much doubt that countries like India or China will give up on their position.
Developing countries also have their reform agenda. They argue that the Uruguay round, which is the first trade negotiations round, concluded in 1994, ended up with several imbalances in fields like Agriculture, and Intellectual property, and that it gave developed countries many flexibilities which are not available to developing countries, like reverse S&D treatment.

In their Trade Policy Review, the US mentions the WTO reforms are one of the pillars of its policy. What could possibly happen in case there is no agreement?

If the US under the Trump Administration continues to put pressure in the next ministerial conference which will be held in Astana, Kazakhstan in 2020, I think this will cause everything else to collapse.

This goes beyond the WTO. Once you turn your back on the WTO, you also do so on other multilateral forums. What about the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations? This is not only about the WTO, but about a big systemic shift.

The US still refuses to take part in renewing the WTO Appellate body, the WTO organ in charge of settling trade disputes, which is threatening to become dysfunctional by December 10th. Is this another mean of pressuring the passing of the reforms they want?

I used to think that the US used this method as a bargaining trick but now I am more inclined to think that the US just does not want to revive the Appellate Body, even if the reforms go through. They simply do not want an appellate body which in some cases has ruled against the US.

Why do developing countries refuse to launch negotiations about issues like e-commerce?

The stakes in negotiating e-commerce are huge. What the US wants is “free data flows” which consist in opening up our digital markets. When the data flows freely, so will the online goods and services. This bypasses any of the tariffs that we have in place right now, as well as the GATT limitations. Today, the products and services concerned might be limited but tomorrow it can be anything under the sun.

This is the heart of the problem. A lot of developing countries are not yet aware of what the game is about. The narrative that is presented to them is that e-commerce is very good for the economy, that it is a reality going forward, that they and the WTO should keep up to with the 21st century, and that all countries need to have trade rules for their digital economy. They are promised programs of assistance in building their digital capacity.

If there is no agreement, do you think we will witness a bigger wave of bilateral treaties in which these measures are discussed?

I think, regardless of what will happen in the WTO, bilateral agreements will continue anyway. They are struggling a lot in any case. Since the Uruguay round, bilateralism was used as a threat by developed countries against developing countries. They would say “if you don’t agree on this in the WTO, we will go through FTAs.” And in fact, they concluded the Uruguay round and launched the NAFTA the same year. I think that they will continue trying to get what they can get in any forum.

How did the Doha round die? Is there any chance of revival?

The negotiations of the Doha round have been suspended to a large degree because some countries would prefer it not to exist. But the Doha round was never formally closed. In every single ministerial conference since its launch, the Ministers would reaffirm the Doha round, before they continue to negotiate. The US is saying that the Doha round died in Nairobi. But there is no formal decision or statement which states this. So technically and legally, the Doha round continues.

Do developing countries still want to negotiate?

Yes, they still want to negotiate the development issues on the Doha round. It is the opposition of several developed countries which prevented further negotiations. But in the end, they cannot dispute the fact that there are still pending, unsolved Doha issues. And it is in our right to call on these mandates for further negotiations.

* South Center is a research-oriented developing countries organization based in Geneva, working on assisting developing countries in presenting development-centered policies in international policy forums.

This interview was conducted in Summer 2019.

Mohamed Haddad supervised, An Hoang-Xuan & Khansa Ben Tarjem reviewed this paper.

“I believed the olive oil sector would be a promising one, so I invested in establishing this mill in 2004, even though the olive grove I own is not very big.” Slim Hamdaoui, farmer and owner of the oil mill, made this winning bet. His transformation plant in the region of Bejaoua, Manouba (Tunis suburb) is “a natural continuity” of his father’s activity. He not only inherited his the 11 hectares, but also an invaluable agricultural knowhow.

The farmer was already motivated by the prospects of the exceptional harvest that reached 350 thousand tons according to official estimates. Like Hamdaoui, almost two thirds (60%) of the total agricultural exploitations in Tunisia, representing 309,000 producers, extract part or all of their revenues from the groves of olive oil trees. 

A bet they placed on the sector, as did the State, by adopting olive oil both as lead export product in its export-led model of growth and as a means to leverage the deficit in the balance of payments.

A Challenging production environment

But the bet does not come without challenges that threaten to bite into farmers’ profit margins. “Labor scarcity is a threat to the harvest” warned Hamdaoui. “We hope there will be enough seasonal workers to cover the farmers’ demand for labor in this abundant season!”. 

He explains that every farmer will want to collect his ripe fruits to prevent losses. And as the harvest season only lasts 3 months, the peak in demand for labor caused a shortage in available seasonal workers. “This compels farmers to bring workers from other regions” according to Hamdaoui, driving further an already hiking cost of production. 

Watch [Arabic]: Who makes the most out of the exceptional Olive season?

The pressure on the profit margins comes also from the fluctuation of the selling price of olives. Beyond excitement, the signs of abundance have particularly triggered concerns of the farmers from the risk of a drop in selling prices. Far earlier than the season, the biggest farmers’ union UTAP called for the National Olive Oil Office to intervene and regulate the market by absorbing the surplus, and setting a reasonable selling price.

As the season started, the numbers came to confirm farmers’ guess. In the Municipal Market of Gremda (Sfax), the biggest souk of olives in the country and also called the country’s “Olive stock market”, the season kicked off with an entry price of 0.75 TND or $0.25 for the kilogram of olive. Never a starting price has been as low in the last 5 seasons, according to the data on the National Oil Office website. 

For Abdallah Ameri, olive producer in Beja and secretary-general of the Association of Tunisian Farmers for Orientation and Development, this market price is far below farmers’ expectations. It barely exceeds the costs of labor, energy, machinery rent for plowing that farmers have to pay throughout the year.

And despite a general increase in the price trend, the aggregate price shown in the graph do not portray all experiences. In the first week of December, in different regions of Kairouan, farmer protests erupted, and a national road was blocked as the price of the Kilogram fell to as low as 0.5 TND according to declarations. Interviewed by local radio Sabra FM, a protesting miller complained: “the price fell from 6 to 4.7 TND/kg in a matter of two days. It is not normal, it is unbearable.” He blames the exporters, the price setters in the market, for manipulating the prices.

A sector under predation

“It is very easy to infiltrate the chain and manipulate prices” For Mokhtar Boubaker, head of the Synagri in Manouba. This unionist explains that there is a growing phenomenon of predation in the sector. 

“Usually, the distribution works as follows: farmers harvest their fruits and sell to olive mills, who later sell to exporters. These intermediaries, often coming from the unregulated sector with limitless resources, position themselves between farmers and olive mills. They suggest to buy the farmer’s harvest ahead of season and to take in charge the costs of labor and transport.”

Boubaker describes the negotiations about selling prices as a deceptive game. “Every year, since the beginning of the season, we would hear that the prices are going to fall. But these are only rumors spread by intermediaries. They play with the fears of farmers and exploit their indebtedness and vulnerable financial situation to push down the buying price. They later sell the harvest to olive mills at market prices. These people are totally “strangers” to the sector. However, their purchase capacity confers them a lot of power.”

This will not be the only story of price manipulation we would hear. An expert in ONH confirms the vulnerability of the sector to infiltration. He relates the story of the 2017 shock, or what he called a “2017 money laundering operation”. “Two years ago, the sector was a victim of the speculation of new actors coming from the unregulated sector. These people used the intermediation between the farmer and the oil-mill in a money-laundering operation.”

The deceptive game of price-setting comes back in this story too. “These actors offered to buy farmers produce at very interesting prices, above the real market price, ahead of season. As communication in the market flows rapidly, no farmer wanted to sell below that price. This drove the general market price up and forced oil mills to buy from farmers at the new price too.” 

However, the price at which olive mills sell to exporters in not determined locally. “Then the news about the international price came. The price revealed lower than the costs for olive mills. This triggered a shock. Millers were forced either to sell the pressed oil to exporters at loss or to keep it in stock until they can find a better liquidation opportunity. The price shock resulted in many of the oil-mills defaulting on loan payments and going bankrupt, or compelled to sell property to reimburse.”

Asked about the reason why these actors would sell to olive mills at no gain or loss, he answered that “these people do not care if they lose in the process, as long as they can bring back a share of that money to the formal sector”

In 2019, two seasons later, debt still burdens almost 50% of the country’s oil-mills, according to the declaration of Mohamed Nasraoui, the head of the National League of Olive Oil producers, on Shems FM. He explains that this burden is creating resistance from transformers to buy farmers’ produce, and pushing farmers to give up the harvest, in the absence of the National Olive Oil as an alternative buyer.

“The Olive oil office played a historical role decades ago in regulating the market. However, this belongs to the past” Mokhtar Boubaker blames the state leaving the sector and the producers to “the unknown”. He argues that there is no clear policy to support and orient such an important sector. 

The rest of the farmers and olive mills expect an intervention. However, to date, the National Oil Office did not start regulating the market yet. 

The State, and the long-awaited intervention

Since the beginning of the season, actors in the sector called on the State to intervene. Farmers unions demanded the absorption of the excess of production to regulate the prices and allow decent benefits to farmers. They also asked for authorities to a bottom selling price for olives at the farms. On the other hand, millers organization, still suffering the 2017, requested the State to support their demand for the rescheduling of their loan payment deadlines to the end of the season.

Contacted at the beginning of the season, the expert of the National Oil Office explained that their institution cannot take in charge the losses of other actors in the sector. “Since the 90s, the State decided to give up its monopoly of the sector and liberalize it. Private businesses were allowed to import and export. From that date, the National Oil Office became equal to any other private actor in the market. We are financially independent and we have to make sure we are not in deficit. If we are going to intervene, who is going to compensate for our financial imbalance?”

The Ministry of Agriculture announced a set of decisions to support the sector, among which is a governmental plan to transfer funds to the National Oil Office to insure what farmers impatiently wait for: the beginning of market regulation. 

However, this set of decisions taken by the Ministry at the end of November remains “far below producers expectations” according to a statement released by the farmer’s union (UTAP) on December 3rd.

The series of governmental measures also include the rescheduling of loans of Oil exporters and Olive mills and the elimination of the payment delay penalties. The Parliament approved in the 2020 finance law a tax cut to allow an equivalent compensation of banks for the dropped penalties. 

This promises to encourage the mills to resume their buying activity, and restore smoothness to the chain. But protests of producers, who are not touched by this measure, continue.

Mohamed Haddad & Khansa Ben Tarjem reviewed this article. Mohamed Alyani contributed reporting.

• The people of Tunisia invented new ways of a revolution in total respect of the legitimacy of laws and constitution and not against it.
• It is an unprecedented cultural revolution, it is not books of leaflets, it is the explosion of an awareness, that took shape after a long silence. It is the realization of the people that he can reorient his destiny.
• Tunisia transitioned from a Law-based-State to a Law-based Society. And Tunisian people genuinely embodied this spirit.
• It is a historical moment, and a revolution which will shake pr-set political conceptions.
• We thank all Tunisians that contributed their efforts to the campaign. 
• Our administration needs to be independent and impartial, and needs to respect  differences. 
• We will fight the threat of terrorism and a bullet from a terrorist will trigger bursts of bullets from our side. 
• Fighting poverty is a must and responsibility on our shoulders. 
• There is no way for unlawful, informal work.
• No one can steal the freedom that people reclaimed with blood. Not under any banner or circumstance. And those who are nostalgic for a old era are running after a mirage, against the history’s trajectory.
• No way for a setback in women’s rights. We need to expand them, especially social & economic rights, as the dignity of the people is in the dignity of women.
• We need to fulfill the hopes of the people for “Jobs, Freedom, and Dignity”
• The people are in need for a new trust relationship between rulers and citizens. 
• Those who gave their blood to liberate the country are ready to contribute their work and money to push it forward. And contribute to reduce and limit its debt. 

• He thank persons in the Tunisian diaspora abroad who said they were ready to donate one day of work to alleviate Tunisian public debt.
• We stand for just causes, and Palestine in the first place. It is not a position against Jews, we protected them and are ready to do it again, but it’s a position against racism and colonization. Our position is not negotiable under any deal.
• We carry the same commitment for our international obligations, but the cooperation between Peoples is the most important.
• We are looking to build a new history in which Humanism is the core value.
• Coming challenges and responsibilities are big. But the will of the people will help new rulers leave a better country for future generations. 
• The president is the symbol of unity and national independence. And no one is better than anyone, only in the love of the country. He shall rise beyond all conflicts. He invites everyone to rally together around national unity, for the benefit of Tunisia.

Find below the video of the full speech.

-Hello. Is this madam Jeannine B Scott? 

-Speaking! 

-Hello, I am Mohamed Haddad, a journalist based in Tunis. I would like to ask you some questions if you don’t mind. 

-Okay

-I have been reading the contract between your company and Mrs Olfa Terras Rambourg and the first question I wanted to ask is, did you know that she is a candidate for the parliamentary elections?

-Now I know, yeah. She wasn’t then. 

-When did you know that? 

-I guess she declared a few weeks back but we had already finished almost all what we were working on.

-But the contract’s registration was done on September 3rd. 

-Yes, because I have asked for a legal opinion so they allowed me to file late, which was when we were already finishing what we were working up. 

-In the 8th point, there is a question about the relationship of your client with political parties or government, saying “Is this foreign principal owned, controlled, directed, financed or subsidized by a foreign political party or government”. And your answer to all the questions was “no”. However, by the contract’s registration date, Olfa Rambourg was already a candidate and she was running at the head of a movement of lists contending for the parliamentary elections. Isn’t there any contradictions in there? 

-No, because, the information apply to the time when she was here. 

-But there is an extension in the end of the contract mentioning that the contract will be valid until the end of October. 

-By the time we filled the document there was not a conflict.

When I do my supplemental filing, then I will have to make an adjustment. But not for that filing. 

-Why was there any extension when the contract was contracted far before that date? 

-Because there were one or two other things that I wanted to do, and I wanted to make sure that everything was covered. 

-Which kind of things? 

-I wanted her to have one other meeting that I was not able to get. 

–When did that meeting take place? 

-It did not take place.

-But you said that the extension was done to allow for another meeting that you did not manage to have in May/June. 

-Exactly, the meeting that I expected to have during the earlier time frame, and I was not able to achieve it. So I extended to cover myself in case I was able to achieve it. 

-And do you know that if you organize meetings or activities for her, or even if you only try, this plays a role in influencing the parliamentary elections that are supposed to take place on October 6th?

-It was supposed to be something achieved before she declared that she is going to be a candidate. And I was never able to get the meeting. so…

-Meanwhile, Mrs Rambourg and her colleagues did not seem to see a limit between the associative and political activities. Did she tell you about any separation or limit between both? 

-Well, it was not a political party. It was a movement. So there is a separation, at the time when she was here. 

-Yes it was not a political party but she was having political activities and running for elections. 

She wasn’t running for elections then. 

-And do you know about the political structure under which she is running for elections? 

-Actually I don’t. I know the movement is called Aich Tounsi and don’t know if it magnified into another thing or not, or that it was doing a political party stuff. 

-Mrs Rambourg totally recognizes that she is doing a political activity and that she is doing that with an association. So legally, it is not a political party, but genuinely, she was doing political activities and it is proved as she is a candidate. So there is a blurry zone here. Did she tell you about this confusion before? 

-No. I don’t think so, for me, there was no confusion. 

-And did you work before with other Tunisian people? 

-No

-And how did you get in touch with Mrs Rambourg? or how did she contact you? 

…

-If you knew she was a political candidate, would it have changed the contract with her? 

-Possibly. 

What would have changed?

I don’t know. It is hypothetical, so I don’t know. 

-Because by answering “possibly”, I thought I understood that there were other things that you would have done differently had you knew about her intentions. What are these things? 

-I am not really sure. I never really thought about it. Because she was never a candidate when we were doing what we had to do together. So out of my mind, I don’t know, I will have to think about it.  

-After fact checking, Mrs Rambourg was talking publicly about becoming a presidential candidate for the Republic of Tunisia, since December 2018. 

-I don’t have anything on record for that. We never have said anything about her becoming a political candidate. 

-That’s a bit interesting. She applied for these election In July 2019. By that time you already agreed together on the contract, since May. And she had to prepare her application during the period of execution of the contract.
–We had fulfilled everything I was going to do in the US at that time. And like I said, there was only one other meeting left.

-With whom was this meeting?
–That’s between me and my client.

-And what was the purpose of this mission?
–Which mission?

-Of this consulting contract. The mission that she asked for.
-She wanted to have an education and exchange campaign. Mostly with civil society organisations in the US to know about their take on Tunisia and Africa. Because, a lot of the work I do is on Africa policies in general, on the whole continent.

-What are the points that would have changed If you knew that she was a candidate?
–My answer was possibly because she wasn’t a candidate it never occurred to me. I don’t know what I would have changed, maybe I would have changed the terms of reference.

-How did you understand the point of the contract 8.B where political activity was clearly mentioned but you did not answer by yes? You just ticked the ‘no’ boxes saying she has no political activity, not financing any political activity. And her movement “Aich Tounsi” is an association. And she had been funding her political activity through the foundation as well. (waiting time)

It Is in the second page on the registration statement.

I had a legal opinion

you asked a lawyer if it is right to run a contract with her?

No, the legal opinion was about whether or not what I am doing with her requires registration. I was looking If I was allowed to file after the fact. That’s what I did in September.

-And when did you sign the extension please?
–I was supposed to get a meeting for her even now, after everything is finished, and now (she’s completely damned up ?)
I think it’s by the end of September I don’t have the file in from of me.

-How can the Tunisian authorities or other candidates be sure that there is no interference between the work that you are doing with Olfa Rambourg as a private person and the work you are doing with her as a candidate. Especially that now, we are in an electoral campaign and the contract was extended and is currently going on?
–I mean, it’s extended, because there was one meeting that I wanted to have for her, that I have not been able to secure. Other than that, there is nothing going on.

-Actually the extension is of two months. Were you charging two months for a meeting that did not take place ?
–I had a discussion with her about amending that contract. Now I am not charging for the two months. By the time I will submit my supplemental file it will be different. But my supplemental is only due in 6 months.

-Is there anything you would like to add or clarify or comment on this case?
–Not particularly.

Beyond stigmatisation and glorification,  M. Saied is unintentionally among the candidates which carry a discourse that only presents and perceives politic through the lens of law, while excluding other social, ethnographic, political aspects. So what political vision is supported by this discourse?

Kais Saied and the relationship to law

On the academic level, Kais Saied is a graduate with a Diploma of Advanced Studies  in international law. He is a lecturer in Tunis and Sousse law faculties. All of his life revolves around law. Married to the President of the civic chamber of the tribunal of first instance, all of his family is socialised to the language of law, which is echoed in his discourse. This strong relationship with constitutional law is the extension of his long academic trajectory. 

Kais Saied was the general secretary of the Tunisian Association of constitutional law from 1990 to 1995. He later became the head of the public law studies department at the Sousse University between 1994 and 1999, period during which Abdelkarim Zbidi was the university’s president. He also worked as a constitutional law expert, for instance with the general secretariat of the Arab League in 1989 and 1990, and later with the Arab Institute for Human Rights from 1993 until 1995. The candidate was called by the media in his quality of legal expert to give an informed insight at various key moments of the political transition. We also recall that he refused to be member of an expert commission to review the new constitution in 2013 in order “not to legitimate the political choices that were already taken”

A democratic alternative? 

Since the first years after the uprising, Kai Saied considered that the élection of a Constituent Assembly emerged from a center-oriented conception of power. Convinced of the need for a reinforced decentralisation, Saied promotes the “inversion of the hourglass of political power”. This means opting for a bottom-up electoral process.

Starting by the election of local councils, which will give birth to regional councils. The regional directors of the central administrations would attend to the meetings of these regional councils. The process will yield regional development plans which respond to the local aspirations.

In this political and administrative reorganization lies a tool inspired by the principles of direct democracy: the revocability of elected officials. These measure constitute the differentiation of the candidate with regards to his competitors. How to put in practice these ideas at a time where the political system is already in place? The candidate suggests organizing a referendum to amend the constitution.  

A conservative candidate 

However, some positions of M. Saied spark controversy over their conservative character. Three main positions are under light: First, his refusal of the “public expression” of homosexuality, ignited by “foreign actors” according to him.

M. Saied is also in favor of maintaining the death penalty, although the sacredness of the right to life is highlighted in the constitution, and despite all the arguments advanced for its abolition. 

The third controversial position is the refusal of equality between men and women in inheritance. Based on a culturalist and sovereigntist argumentation, Kais Saied rejects any debate about the issue, which was notably mentioned in the report of the Commission for Individual Freedoms and Equality mostly known under the name of “Colibe”.

These 3 key points are what make his retired academic clear positioning on the “socio-cultural question. In the eyes of a part of civil society, working on the protection and consolidation of civil and democratic achievements, these positions are not welcomed. 

0.9 points decrease in inflation, a decrease in budget deficit and an appreciating dinar

“An adapted monetary policy” as describes Bjorn Rother, chief of the IMF mission in Tunisia, seconding Abbassi, albeit vulnerabilities related to a growing debt and political instability.

He praised the Ministry of Finance on exceeding the goals set on the collection of unpaid receivables and emphasises the importance of a reinforcement of the protection of low-income household as a necessary parallel policy.

The chief of the IMF mission has lauded what he called a “voluntary approach” Tunisia has adopted in the implementation of the expected reforms. From his side, The Cental Banks governor, Marouan Abbassi, insisted that the policies and reforms implemented are the fruit of join work with the Brettonwoods institution, rather than a “result of pressure” as echoe a fringe of the public opinion. 

In response to a question about fuel price hike and public sector salaries, two controversial topics for the public opinion, the IMF representative confirmed that another price increase shall be expected, emphasizing the necessity of parallel protection of vulnerable households, as energy subsidies remaining a heavy expense burden. The statement comes despite a recognition in the press release, that the price increase “ weights on the fiscal and external current accounts”. 

Another fuel price increase shall be expected

On the salaries of the civil servants, the executive reminded that the Fund was against the lastest February salary increase instored in February, an outcome of the social negotiation with the labor union (UGTT) and insisted on the necessity of a deflating the bloated public sector in which “civil servants still earn more than their counterparts in similar positions in the private sector”. As voluntary departure policy has yielded modest results, he encouraged the government to do more effort on “redeployment” to fill vacant positions as a substitute to a recruitment policy.

IMF encouraged the government to do more effort on “redeployment” to fill vacant positions as a substitute to a recruitment policy

On another note, Rother highlights that the exchange rate flexibility policy and the resulting depreciation of the dinar take time to yield the positive results, but were a key driver in export increase.. The leverage of the budgetary balance dependent of export performance, the current appreciation is expected to slow the recovery.

Abbassi remains optimistic about the future. The expected entry into production of Nawara gaz field and the abundant harvest promising less need for energy and wheat import and an increase in agricultural exports.

Rother, on the other hand emphasized the necessity to accelerate the implementation of the reform, a garantee for better economic recovery and performance.